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Abstract With the increased need of data sharing among multiple organizations
like government organizations, ﬁnancial corporations, medical hospitals and aca-
demic institutions, it is critical to ensure data integrity so that effective decisions
can be made based on these data. An important component of any solution for as-
sessing data integrity is represented by techniques and tools to evaluate the trustwor-
thiness of data provenance. However, few efforts have been devoted to investigate
approaches for assessing how trusted the data are, based in turn on an assessment
of the data sources and intermediaries. To bridge this gap, we propose a data prove-
nance trust model. Our trust model takes into account various factors that may affect
the trustworthiness and, based on these factors, assigns trust scores to both data and
data providers. Such trust scores represent key information based on which data
users may decide whether to use the data and for which purposes.
1 Introduction
Today the need of sharing data within and across the organizations is more critical
than ever. The availability of comprehensive data makes it possible to extract more
accurate and complete knowledge and thus supports more informed decision mak-
ing. However reliance on data for decision making processes requires data to be of
good quality and trusted. We refer to such requirements as high-assurance data in-
tegrity. Without high-assurance integrity, information extracted from available data
cannot be trusted. While there has been some efforts to ensure conﬁdentiality when
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sharing data, the problem of high-assurance data integrity has not been widely in-
vestigated. Previous approaches have either addressed the problem of protection
from data tampering, through the use of digital signature techniques, or the problem
of semantic integrity, that is, making sure that the data is consistent with respect
to some semantic assertions. However even though these techniques are important
components of any comprehensive solution to high-assurance data integrity, they
do not address the question on whether one can actually trust certain data. Those
techniques, for example, do not protect against data deception, according to which
a malicious party may provide on purpose some false data, or against the fact that a
party is unable, for various reasons, to provide good data. Techniques, like those de-
veloped in the area of data quality (e.g. [1]), may help; however they often require
the availability of good quality data sources against which one can compare the data
at hand and correct them.
It is clear that in order to address the problem of high-assurance data integrity
we need comprehensive solutions combining several different techniques. In partic-
ular, one important issue in determining data integrity is the trustworthiness of data
provenance. For example, a malicious source provider may announce that a small
company has successfully signed a big contract which is not true in reality. This
information is then passed to a stock analysis agent, based on which the agent in-
fers that the stock prize of that company will go up with high probability and send
this information to end users. If the data users, based on this information, decide
to acquire stocks of such company, they may end up with severe ﬁnancial losses.
In contrast, the data users will have a big chance to avoid such a loss if they know
that the source provider is not very trustworthy. Though a lot of research has been
carried out for data provenance, they mainly focus on the collection and semantic
analysis of provenance information [2, 5, 4]. Little has been done with respect to the
trustworthiness of data provenance.
To evaluate the trustworthiness of data provenance, we need to answer questions
like “Where did the data come from? How trustworthy is the original data source?
Who handled the data? Are the data managers trustworthy?” More speciﬁcally, for
example, if data X is from source A, how do we determine the trustworthiness of
source A. If X arrives at D via B andC, how to tell if X is accurate at D? Also if data
X now from D and dataY coming from E are merged by intermediate agent F, then
how do we determine the trustworthiness of the resulting data? To address these
challenges, we propose a data provenance trust model which estimates the level of
trustworthiness of both data and data providers by assigning trust scores to them.
Based on the trust scores, users can make their more informed decisions whether or
not to use the data.
To build such trust model, we take into account various aspects that may affect
the trustworthiness of the data. In particular, these aspects are data similarity, data
conﬂict, path similarity and data deduction. Similar data items are considered as
supports to one another, while conﬂicting data items compromise trustworthiness
of one another. Besides data similarity and data conﬂict, the way that the data was
collected is also an important factor when determining the trustworthiness of the
data. For example, if several independent sources provide the same data, such dataTrust Evaluation of Data Provenance 3
is most likely to be true. Data deduction measures the effect of the process (e.g. data
mining) on the data. Usually, the trustworthiness of the resulting data depends on
the trustworthiness of input data and the on the parties that process the data.
We also observe that a data is likely to be true if it is provided by trustworthy data
providers, and a data provider is trustworthy if most data it provides are true. Due
to such inter-dependency between data and data providers, we develop an iterative
procedure to compute the trust scores. To start the computation, each data provider
is ﬁrst assigned an initial trust score which can be obtained by querying available
information about data providers. At each iteration, we compute the trustworthiness
of the data based on the combined effects of the aforementioned four aspects, and
recompute the trustworthiness of the data provider by using the trust scores of the
data it provides. When a stable stage is reached, that is, when the changes of trust
scores are negligible, the trust computation process stops.
In summary, this paper makes the following major contributions.
• We formulate the problem of evaluating data provenance in order to determine
the trustworthiness of data and data providers.
• We propose a data provenance trust model which deﬁnes the trustworthiness
of data and data providers. We models four key factors that inﬂuence the trust
scores.
• We develop algorithms to compute trust scores and our experimental results
demonstrate its efﬁciency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some pre-
liminary deﬁnitions. Section 3 presents the proposed data provenance trust model
including the algorithms for trust score computation. Section 4 reports the exper-
imental results. Section 5 reviews related work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper and outlines future research directions.
2 Preliminary Deﬁnitions
In this section, we ﬁrst describe a scenario illustrating the problem of data prove-
nance, and then introduce several deﬁnitions used in our trust model.
Data provenance includes information about the process thr-ough which data
have been generated and the input and output data of these processes. In this paper,
we consider a common scenario (see Figure 1) in which there are multiple parties
characterized as data source providers, intermediate agents and data users. Each
partyisidentiﬁedbyauniqueidentiﬁer.Datasourceproviderscouldbesensornodes
or agents that continuously produce large volumes of data items. Those data items
describethepropertiesofcertainentitiesorevents.Intermediateagentscouldsimply
pass the data items obtained from data source providers to data users, or make use
of the data items to generate knowledge items consumed by data users or other
intermediate agents. Data users are the ﬁnal information consumers who expect to4 Chenyun Dai, Dan Lin, Elisa Bertino, and Murat Kantarcioglu
Fig. 1 Example scenario
receive trustworthy data. For representation simplicity, we will refer to a data item
or a knowledge item as an item when the context is clear.
In this paper, we model an item (denoted as r) as a row in a relational table and
each item has k attributes A1, ..., Ak. For an item r, its value of attribute Ai (1≤i≤k)
is denoted as r(Ai). Table 1 gives an example of location reports that will be used
throughout the paper. As shown in the table, there are ﬁve items, each of which
has seven attributes  RID, SSN, Name, Gender, Age, Location, Date . RID is the
identiﬁer of each item.
RID SSN Name Gender Age Location Date
1 479065188 Chris Male 45 West Lafayette 4pm 08/18/2007
2 47906518 Chris Male 45 West Lafayette 4pm 08/18/2007
3 479065188 John Male 45 Los Angels 7pm 08/18/2007
4 4790651887 Chris Male 45 Chicago 4pm 08/18/2007
5 479065188 Chris Male 45 Purdue University 4pm 08/18/2007
Table 1 Data Representation
Due tothepossible presence ofmalicious source providers and inaccurate knowl-
edge generated by intermediate agents, the information provided to the data users
could be wrong or misleading. Therefore, it would be very helpful that each piece of
information received by data users is rated by a trust score indicating the trustwor-
thiness level of the information. By using the trust score, data users can determine
whether they want to directly use the received information or need to further verify
the information. Moreover, each data source provider (intermediate agent) is also
assigned a trust score based on the amount of correct information it has provided. InTrust Evaluation of Data Provenance 5
the following, we present formal deﬁnitions of the level of trustworthiness for data
items, knowledge items, data source providers and intermediate agents.
Deﬁnition 1. Trust of data items and knowledge items. The trustworthiness of a
data items f (or a knowledge item k), denoted as t(f) (or t(k)), is the probability of
f (or k) being correct.
Deﬁnition 2. Trust of source providers and intermediate agents. The trustwor-
thiness of a source provider s (or an intermediate agent a), denoted as t(s) (or t(a)),
is the expected trustworthiness of the data items provided by s (or a).
Different items about the same entity or event may be either supportive or con-
ﬂicting. For example, one item in Table 1 claims that a person named “Chris” was in
Lafayette at 4pm on 08/18/2007, while another item claims that he was in Chicago
at that time. Obviously, at least one of the items is false. In another case, there is
another item claiming that “Chris” was at Purdue University at 4pm on 08/18/2007,
this item is more likely to report some true information provided that the ﬁrst item
is true. This is because Purdue University is located at West Lafayette, and the two
items support each other. In order to represent such relationships, we introduce the
notions of data similarity and data conﬂict. Speciﬁcally, data similarity models how
the trust scores of similar items affect each other, while data conﬂict models how
the trust scores of conﬂicting items affect each other.
In addition to data similarity and conﬂict, the source providers and routing paths
also affect the trustworthiness of data items or knowledge items. Suppose each
source provider (or intermediate agent) has associated with a probability quanti-
fying the likelihood of reporting wrong information. The probability of multiple
source providers (or intermediate agent) reporting the same wrong information is
lower than that of a single source provider. Therefore, the less correlation among
source providers and routing paths of the same information, the more can to trust
this information. For example, the ﬁrst two items in Table 1 reports the location in-
formation about the same person “Chris”, both of which claimed that “Chris” was
in West Lafayette at 4:00pm on 08/18/2007. If these two items came from different
source providers and were routed to the data user through different paths, they can
be considered as valuable supports to each other. If the two reports came from same
source providers or shared very similar routing paths, the importance of considering
these two reports as supportive of each other is reduced. Based on these observa-
tions, we introduce the notion of path similarity, which is the similarity between
two item generation paths as deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3. Item Generation Path. For an item r, let S be its source provider, and
let I1,...,Im be m intermediate agents that processed r. The item generation path of
r is a sequence of “S → I1 → ... → Im”.
In a network system, an item generation path (path for short) is corresponding
to a sequence of IP addresses of source providers and intermediate agents. In in-
formation processing organizations, a path is corresponding to a sequence of de-
partment names. Consider the ﬁrst item in Table 1. Suppose the item was gen-
erated by a source provider named “airport” and passed by intermediate agents6 Chenyun Dai, Dan Lin, Elisa Bertino, and Murat Kantarcioglu
Fig. 2 An Example of Data Deduction
“police−station1” and “policestation2”, the path of this item is represented as
“airport → policestation1 → policestation2”. In this paper, we assume that every
source provider and intermediate agent has a unique identiﬁer.
Items can be merged or processed by intermediate agents. As an example, con-
sider the ﬁrst and fourth items in Table 1. The ﬁrst item states that “Chris” was in
West Lafayette at 4:00pm 08/18/2007 and the fourth one states that “Chris” was in
Los Angeles at 7:00pm 08/18/2007. Given these two inputs, an intermediate agent
produces the knowledge (see Figure 2) that from 4:00pm to 7:00pm 08/18/2007
“Chris” was on an airplane from West Lafayette to Los Angeles. The trustworthi-
ness of such generate knowledge items largely depends on the trustworthiness of
input data and the agent. To model this scenario, we introduce another concept,
namely data deduction.
3 A Trust Model for Data Provenance
In this section, we present our data provenance trust model, that we use for assigning
trust scores to items (i.e., data items or knowledge items), source providers and
intermediate agents. Trust scores range from 0 to 1; higher scores indicate higher
trust levels.
The trust score of an item is computed by taking into account four factors: (i)
data similarity; (ii) path similarity; (iii) data conﬂict; and (iv) data deduction. In
what follows, we present the details on the evaluation of these factors.
3.1 Data Similarity
Data similarity refers to the likeness of different items. Similar items are considered
as supportive to each other.
The challenge here is how to determine whether two items are similar. Consider
the example in table 1. We can observe that the ﬁrst two items are very similar since
they both report the same locations of Chris at the same date. The only difference
between these two items is a possible typo error in the person’s SSN. In contrast,
the third item is different from the ﬁrst two because the third one reports a totally
different location. Based on these observations, we propose to employ a clusteringTrust Evaluation of Data Provenance 7
algorithm to group items describing the same event. The purpose of the clustering
is to eliminate minor errors like typos in the example and hence we adopt a strict
threshold s. After clustering, we obtain sets of items and each set represents a single
event.
For each item r, the effect of data similarity on its trust score, denoted as sim(r),
is determined by the number of items in the same cluster and the size of the cluster.
We introduce the formal deﬁnition of sim(r) as follows.
sim(r) = e
−Fc
Nc (1)
In equation 1, NC is the number of records in cluster C and fC is the diameter of
cluster C. Here we deﬁne fC as the maximum distance between two records in the
cluster. It is worth noting that items in the same cluster have same data similarity
score.
We now proceed to elaborate the clustering procedure. The key of a clustering
algorithm is the distance function that measures the dissimilarities among data items
and the cost function which the clustering algorithm tries to minimize. The distance
functions are usually determined by the type of data being clustered, while the cost
function is deﬁned by the speciﬁc objective of the clustering problem.
The data we consider in our problem contains different types of attributes. In
this paper, we focus on three commonly used types of attributes, namely numerical,
categorical and string. Note that it is very easy to extend our clustering method to
all kinds of attributes.
• Distance between two numerical values.
The numerical attribute values belong to integer, real, or date/time data types.
The distance between two numerical values v1 and v2 is deﬁned based on their
difference as shown in equation 2, where v1,v2 ∈ D . |D | is the domain size,
which is measured by the difference between the maximum and minimum values
in D deﬁned by the system.
dN(v1,v2) = |v1−v2|/|D | (2)
• Distance between two categorical values.
For the categorical values, we not only consider the exact match of two values,
but also consider their semantics similarity. Let D be a categorical domain and
TD be a taxonomy tree deﬁned for D . Then distance between two categorical
values v1 and v2 (v1,v2 ∈ D )[3] is deﬁned as follows.
dc(v1,v2) = H(R(v1,v2))/H(TD ) (3)
where R(v1,v2) is the subtree rooted at the lowest common ancestor of v1 and v2,
and H(TD ) represents the height of tree TD .
• Distance between two string values.
The distance between two string values is deﬁned based on edit distance [6]. The
edit distance between two strings of characters is the number of operations (i.e.,8 Chenyun Dai, Dan Lin, Elisa Bertino, and Murat Kantarcioglu
change, insert, delete) required to transform one of them into the other. Given
two string values v1 and v2, their distance is deﬁned as follows.
dS(v1,v2) = E(v1,v2)/|L | (4)
where |v1| and |v2| is the number of characters in v1 and v2 respectively, L is
max{|v1|,|v2|}, and E(v1,v2) is the edit distance between v1 and v2.
Edit distance between two string values can be computed in O(|v1| |v2|) time
using a dynamic programming algorithm. If v1 and v2 have a ’similar’ length,
about ’n’, this complexity is O(n2).
Combining the distance functions of numerical, categorical and string values, we
are now able to deﬁne the distance between two items. Let A T = {AN1,...,ANm,
AC1,... ,ACn, AS1, ..., ASj} be the attributes of table T, where ANi(i = 1,...,m) is a
numerical attribute, ACi(i = 1,...,n) is a categorical attribute and ASi(i = 1,..., j) is
a string attribute. The distance between two items r1,r2 ∈ T (denoted as △(r1,r2))
is deﬁned as follows.
△(r1,r2) = å
i=1,...,m
dN(r1[ANi],r2[ANi])+ å
i=1,...,n
dC(r1[ACi],r2[ACi])
+ å
i=1,...,j
dS(r1[ASi],r2[ASi]) (5)
Thus, the diameter of a cluster fC is computed as follows.
fc = maxr1∈C,r2∈C△(r1,r2) (6)
Next, we present how to cluster items by using our deﬁned distance functions.
Our clustering algorithm cluster the items incrementally. First, we make the ﬁrst
item a cluster and the representative of that cluster. Second, for each unvisited item,
wecompareitwithrepresentativesofexistedclusters;ifweﬁndarepresentativethat
the distance between the item and this representative is within the threshold s and
also the lest, we add this item to the cluster the representative belongs to; if it cannot
ﬁnd such a representative, we make this item a new cluster and the representative of
this cluster.
This procedure continues until all the items have been visited. Finally, we obtain
a set of clusters that the distance between the representative and the members of the
cluster is within threshold s.
Note that the value of s is very small as the goal of the clustering process is to
ﬁnd most similar items. This makes it possible to randomly select an item as the
representative of each cluster.
3.2 Path Similarity
As we already mentioned, we know that a larger number of similar data cannot
guarantee a higher trust level of this set of data since path similarity affects the
importance of supports obtained from similar data. In what follows, we show howTrust Evaluation of Data Provenance 9
to compute path similarity and how to integrate the impact of path similarity to the
computation of the overall trust score.
Given two items r1 and r2, suppose their paths are P1 and P2 respectively. The
path similarity between P1 and P2 is deﬁned as follows.
pathsim(r1,r2) =
max{|P1|,|P2|}−Idist
max{|P1|,|P2|}
(7)
where max{|P1|,|P2|} is the maximum number of identiﬁers in the two sequences,
and Idist is the edit distance between two sequences. Note that unlike edit distance
of two strings which is based on the difference of characters, Idist is based on the
difference of identiﬁers. An example of path similarity computation is given below.
Example 1. Suppose P1 =“purdueairport → policestation1 → policestation2”
and P2=“LosAngelsairport →policestation1 →policestation2”. max{|P1|,|P2|} =
max{3,3} = 3. Idist is 1, since only one difference exists between P1 and P2 which
is the ﬁrst identiﬁer, the airport name. Finally, pathsim is (3-1)/3=0.67.
Next, we modify equation (1) by taking into account the effect of path similar-
ity. The new sim(r) denoted as sim∗(r) is deﬁned as follows, where w is the path
similarity factor ranging from 0 to 1.
sim∗(r) = e
− Fc
Nc wc (8)
In particular, wc is computed as follows. First, we randomly select an item from
cluster C, denoted as r. We mark r and assign it a weighted value 1. Second, we
randomly select an unmarked item from C, denoted as r′. We compute pathsim be-
tween r′ and all marked items, among which we keep the maximum pathsim(r′,ri).
Then we mark r′ and assign it a weighted value 1− pathsim(r′,ri). This procedure
is continued until all items are marked. Finally, we take the average of the weighted
values of all items in cluster C as wc.
3.3 Data Conﬂicts
Data conﬂict refers to inconsistent descriptions or information about the same entity
or event. A simple example of a data conﬂict is that the same person appears at
different locations during the same time period. It is obvious that data conﬂict has
a negative impact on the trustworthiness of items, and hence in the following we
discuss how to quantify its effect on the trust score computation.
There are various reasons for data conﬂicts, such as typos, false data items gen-
erated by malicious source providers, or misleading knowledge items generated by
intermediate agents. Data conﬂict largely depends on the knowledge domain of the
speciﬁc application. Therefore, our trust model allows users to deﬁne their own data
conﬂict functions according to their application-dependent requirements.
To determine if two items conﬂict with each other, data users ﬁrst need to deﬁne
the exact meaning of conﬂict, which we call prior knowledge. Consider the example10 Chenyun Dai, Dan Lin, Elisa Bertino, and Murat Kantarcioglu
in Table 1 again. The attribute value of “SSN” in the ﬁrst item is the same as that in
the third item, but the attribute value of “Name” in the ﬁrst item is different from that
in the third one. This implies a data conﬂict, since we know that each single SSN
should correspond to only one individual. We can further infer that there should
be something wrong with either source providers (airports) or intermediate agents
(police stations) whichever handled these two items. The prior knowledge we use
here is that if r1(“SSN”) = r2(“SSN”) then r1(“Name”) = r2(“Name”). If any two
items cannot satisfy the condition stated by such prior knowledge, these two items
are considered conﬂicting with each other.
To facilitate automatic conﬂict detection, we propose a simple language for data
users to deﬁne prior knowledge. Prior knowledge with respect to a set of items
contains a set of prior knowledge items which are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4. Prior Knowledge Item. Let r1 be any item that has a set of at-
tributes A r1, and r2 be any item that has a set of attributes A r2. Let A 1, A 2⊆ A r1∪
A r2, and let condition1 and condition2 be Boolean expressions on A 1 and A 2
respectively. A prior knowledge item with respect to r1 and r2 has the form of:
condition1 =⇒ condition2. We say that r1 and r2 satisfy this prior knowledge item
iff when condition1 is evaluated true on the attribute values of r1 and r2, condition2
are also evaluated true on the attribute values of r1 and r2.
Based on prior knowledge, we deﬁne the data conﬂict between two items.
Deﬁnition 5. Conﬂicting Items. Let r1 and r2 be two items, and PK1, ..., PKm be
prior knowledge items. We say that r1 conﬂicts with r2 iff ∃PKi(1 ≤ i ≤ m), r1 and
r2 cannot satisfy PKi.
We proceed now to discuss how to automatically detect data conﬂicts according
to the above deﬁnitions. Recall that items are clustered by using a strict threshold
and hence items in the same cluster are very similar to one another. By leverag-
ing this property, we do not need to compare all items to ﬁnd out the conﬂicting
pairs. Instead, we only check the representative of each cluster. Suppose that the
representatives of two clusters C1 and C2 conﬂict with each other. The data conﬂict
score of one cluster against another cluster is determined by the distance between
two clusters and the number of items in the second cluster taking into account path
similarity. In particular, we have the following equation of data conﬂict.
conc1(C1,C2) = e
− 1
d(C1,C2) Nc2 wc2 (9)
where Nc2 is the number of items in cluster C2, d(C1,C2) is the distance between
two clusters and wc2 is the path similarity factor.
3.4 Data Deduction
The trustworthiness of a knowledge item also depends on the trustworthiness of in-
formation used to generate it and the trustworthiness of parties that handle it. Gener-
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resulting data will also be highly trusted. We deﬁne the function of data deduction
as follows.
Deﬁnition 6. Data Deduction. Let a be an intermediate agent, and let k be a knowl-
edge item generated by a based on items r1, ..., rn. The data deduction of k, repre-
sented as a function Dedk(t(a), t(r1), ..., t(rn)), indicates the impact of the trustwor-
thiness of r1,..., rn, and a on the trustworthiness of k.
We compute the effect of trustworthiness of a source provider or an agent on
its resulting data by taking into account the actions it took on this data. Types of
actions may differ in different applications. In this paper, we consider two typical
actions, “PASS” and “INFER”. “PASS” means merely passing data to another agent
or data user, and “INFER” means that the agent produces a knowledge item based
on the input information and possibly some local knowledge. Different actions may
havedifferentimpactonthetrustworthinessoftheoutputinformation.Forexample,
“PASS” operation simply passes the input items to successive parties. Since such
operation does not change the content of the information, the trustworthiness of the
output should be the same as that of the input if no error is introduced during the
transmission. By contrast, “INFER” generates new knowledge based on the input
information.
Given a set of items and an intermediate agent, we employ a weighted function
to compute the trust score of the output information.
t(k) =
wi t(a)+
ån
j=1t(rj)
n
2
(10)
Here, wi is a parameter based on the operation the intermediate agent takes and its
impact on the trustworthiness of knowledge k.
3.5 Computing Trust Scores
So far, we are clear how the four aspects inﬂuence the trustworthiness of items. In
this subsection, we will present how to combine the effects of these four aspects to
obtain an overall trust score for data items, knowledge items, source providers and
intermediate agents.
The computation of the overall trust scores is an iterative procedure. Initially, we
assign each source provider and intermediate agent an initial trust score by query-
ing the information that the end users already knew. The initial trustworthiness of
each data item and knowledge item is then set to the trustworthiness of its source
providers and intermediate agent, denoted as t(f) and t(k) respectively. Then, we
start the iteration. At each iteration, there are four main steps.
First, we update current trust score of each data item and knowledge item by
using the sim∗(r) function. For a data item f in cluster C with sim∗(f), its updated
trustworthiness is deﬁned as:12 Chenyun Dai, Dan Lin, Elisa Bertino, and Murat Kantarcioglu
t(f) = 1−Õ
r∈C
(1−t(r) sim∗(f)) (11)
The above equation can be rewritten as follows.
1−t(f) =Õ
r∈C
(1−t(r) sim∗(f)) (12)
After taking logarithm on both sides, we have
ln(1−t(f)) = å
r∈C
ln(1−t(r)×sim∗(f)) (13)
Let t(f) = −ln(1−t(f)), and j(r) = −ln(1−t(r)×sim∗(f). Equation 13 is re-
vised as follows.
t(f) = å
r∈C
j(r) (14)
Second, we integrate the effect of data conﬂict into the current trust score. For a
f in cluster C1, if C1 conﬂicts with C2, we update t(f) to t∗(f) as follows.
t∗(f) = t(f)+t(rc2)×conc1(C1,C2) (15)
where rc2 is the representor of C2 and t(rc2) is its trust score. Then, we revise t(f)
as follows.
t(f) = 1−e−t∗(f) (16)
Similarly, we can compute t(k) for each knowledge item.
Third, we consider the data deduction for the knowledge item and update t(k).
Finally, we compute the trust scores for source providers S and intermediate
agents I, denoted ast(S) and t(I) respectively. t(S) is computed as the average trust-
worthiness of data items provided by S. t(I)) is computed as the average trustwor-
thiness of data items and knowledge items provided by I.
t(S) =
åf∈F(S)t(f)
|F(S)|
(17)
t(I) =
åf∈F(I)t(f)+åk∈K(I)t(k)
|F(I)|+|K(I)|
(18)
where F(S) (F(I)) is the set of data items provided by S (I), and K(I) is the set
of knowledge items generated by I. The iteration stops when the changes on trust
scores becomes negligible. An overview of the algorithm is shown in Figure 3.
4 Performance Study
Our experiments are conducted on a 2.6-GHz Pentium 4 machine with 1 Gbyte of
main memory.
Due to the lack of appropriate real datasets, we generate synthetic datasets ac-
cording to the scenario given in Table 1. We ﬁrst generate a set of seeds whichTrust Evaluation of Data Provenance 13
Procedure Turst Score Computation
1. cluster data facts and knowledge items
2. for each cluster
3. compute data similarity
4. compute path similarity
5. compute data conﬂict
6. assign initial trust scores to all the source providers
intermediate agents
7. repeat
8. for each data fact and knowledge item
9. compute its trust score
10. for each knowledge item
11. compute data deduction
12. recompute trust score of the knowledge item
by combining the effect of data deduction
13. compute trust scores for all the source providers
and intermediate agents
14. until the change of trust scores is ignorable
Fig. 3 Trust Score Computation
are tuples with seven attributes as shown in Table 1. Each seed represents a unique
event. To generate items in the dataset, we randomly select a seed and slightly mod-
ify a randomly chosen attribute of this seed. In order to simulate data conﬂict, we
use a prior knowledge item stating that items with same SSN and similar name must
be in the same location at the same time. Then we modify the location information
in the same set of seeds to generate conﬂicting items. The percentage of conﬂicting
items is set to 10%. In this way, we ensure that a dataset contains both similar items
and conﬂicting items.
To generate the item generation path, we constructs a network containing 100
source providers and 1000 intermediate agents. For each item, its generation path
is then generated by randomly selecting a source provider and multiple agents. We
have tested the cases when the average length of item generation path varies from 5
to 10. Table 2 offers an overview of the parameters used in the ensuing experiments,
where values in bold are default values.
At current stage we mainly focus on evaluating efﬁciency of our approach, i.e.,
running time. We plan to carry out human studies in the future to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our approach.
4.1 Effect of Varying Data Sizes
We ﬁrst study the efﬁciency of our approach when varying the size of datasets from
10K to 50K. The trust score computation consists of two main phases: initialization
phase (steps 1-6 in the algorithm in Figure 3) and iteration phase (steps 7-14 in
Figure 3). We plot running time of the two phases in Figure 4(a) and (d) respectively.14 Chenyun Dai, Dan Lin, Elisa Bertino, and Murat Kantarcioglu
Parameter Setting
Number of source providers 100
Number of intermediate agents 1000
Number of seeds 100, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000
Percentage of conﬂicting items 10%
Average length of path 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Dataset Size 10k, 20k, 30k, 40k, 50k
Table 2 Parameters and Their Settings
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Fig. 4 Experimental Results
As shown in Figure 4(a), the running time of initialization phase increases
quickly when the dataset size becomes large. This is because in the worst case the
complexity of the clustering algorithm, the computation of data similarity, path sim-
ilarity and data conﬂict are O(n2). Although the initialization phase looks costly,
it takes less than two minutes for a datast of 50K items, which is still practical for
off-line applications. Also, we need to note that this phase needs to be executed only
once as long as the items remain the same. That is, the results obtained from this
phase can be reused when trust scores of source providers or agents are changed.
Further, an insertion or a deletion of an item only affects several clusters containing
or close to this item, which means a large portion of previously computed results
are still valid.
Compared to the initialization phase, the iteration phase is much faster (see Fig-
ure 4(d)). It needs less than one second to compute trust scores for 50K items. This
is because the iteration phase simply computes score functions based on the results
obtained from initialization phase and trust scores converge to stable values in a
short time using our algorithm.Trust Evaluation of Data Provenance 15
4.2 Effect of Varying the Number of Seeds
Next, we study the performance when varying the number of seeds to generate a
dataset of 30K items. As shown in Figure 4(b), the running time of the initialization
phase ﬁrst decreases and then increases as the number of seeds increases. The reason
of such behavior is the following. The number of seeds corresponds to the number
of clusters. When there are few clusters, the computation of data conﬂict among
clusters is very fast and most time is spent on computing data similarity and path
similarity within the same cluster. In contrast, when the number of clusters is large,
most time is spent on computing data conﬂict among clusters.
As for the iteration phase shown in Figure 4(e), the running time is not affected
by the change of the number of seeds. This is because the performance of iteration
phase is determined by the number of items and the network structure that affects
data deduction computation. As long as these two factors remain unchanged, the
performance is constant.
4.3 Effect of Varying the Length of Item Generation Path
In this experiment, we examine the effect of varying the average length of item
generation path. As shown in Figure 4(c) and (f), the running time of both phases
increases with the length of item generation path. This is because the longer the
path is, the more time is needed to compare the similarity between two paths in
initialization phase and the more time to compute the data deduction in the iteration
phase.
5 Related Work
Whereas there has been a lot of work dealing with provenance [2, 4, 5], no work
deals with evaluating trust of data sources and provenance paths. The most relevant
work is by Yin et al. [7], which mainly deals conﬂicting information provided by
different websites and aims at discovering true facts. Compared to our trust model,
their approach has several drawbacks. First, they do not show how to compute im-
plication between two items, whereas we introduce the notions of data similarity
and data conﬂicts and propose an approach to quantify them. Second, their model
contains a large number of of parameters which are hard to determine. Third, they
assume that an identiﬁer exists able to link different items corresponding to the
same object. Without a correct identiﬁer, their approach does not work. Such an as-
sumption is strong and seems unrealistic in many real applications. In contrast, our
approach can deal with more general situations.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce and formulate the problem of determining the trustwor-
thiness of data and data providers in the context of a data provenance framework. To16 Chenyun Dai, Dan Lin, Elisa Bertino, and Murat Kantarcioglu
address this problem, we propose a trust model which assigns trust scores to both
data and data providers. We have considered four important factors that inﬂuence
trustworthiness, and our trust model effectively combines these factors during the
trust score computation. We have evaluated the efﬁciency of our approach and the
experimental results indicate the feasibility of our approach. In the near future we
plan to evaluate the effectiveness of our system. We will also investigate how to
dynamically adjust our trust model when new information keeps streaming into the
system.
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